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Civil Procedure: Time to Stand Back: Unnecessary GateKeeping to Oklahoma Courts
[S]tanding .. . is an answer to the very first question that is
sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of another's
actions: "What's it to you? "'
I. Introduction
The word "standing" does not appear in the U.S. Constitution, nor does it
appear in the Oklahoma Constitution. Despite definitive pronouncements by
the U.S. Supreme Court that state courts are not bound by federal standing
principles, 2 the Oklahoma Supreme Court has implemented state standing
requirements that precisely mirror the federal standing doctrine.3
Implementing the federal standing doctrine into Oklahoma state law has
effectively denied potential plaintiffs access to the state court system. This
note argues that Oklahoma courts should more distinctively define this state's
standing requirements by reinstating the standing guidelines applied in
Oklahoma prior to the adoption of the federal standing doctrine, thereby
allowing plaintiffs with legitimate grievances redress through the state
judiciary.
Part II of the note evaluates the current state of federal standing law. It
provides an overview of the constitutional and prudential elements of federal
standing, followed by a summary of the justifications behind imposing
standing requirements as a basis to determine who may obtain judicial review
in federal court. Part III reviews the development of standing requirements
under Oklahoma law. This part describes Oklahoma's adherence to federal
standing jurisprudence and details instances when Oklahoma courts have
denied state judicial review by applying the federal standing requirements.
Part IV concludes with a critical analysis of Oklahoma's conformity to federal
standing requirements. This critique focuses on the different policy objectives
behind federal versus state governance. It also suggests reasons why
1. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
2. Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ("[T]he constraints of Article Ill do
not apply to state courts."); see also N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1, 8 n.2 (1988) ("[T]he special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts.").
3. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ":Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1838 (2001) (noting that "[m]any state courts do
model").
conform the scope of their judicial function to the Article III
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Oklahoma courts should develop more state-specific standing requirements
than that which the U.S. Supreme Court mandates for claims brought in the
federal court system.
. History of the Standing Doctrine
Standing is the threshold requirement4 that focuses on who is entitled to
seek judicial relief for an alleged violation of law.' Standing is one of three
components included within the larger rubric ofjusticiability.6 To ensure that
federal courts hear only cases of a truly "judicial nature," the litigant and his
claim must satisfy the justiciability requirements before seeking resolution of
a dispute." Thus, the standing requirement serves as one limitation on the
power of federal courts to resolve only certain claims.8
A. Requirements of FederalStanding
Standing in the federal court system incorporates two distinct components - "[the] constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and
prudential limits on its exercise." 9 Whereas application of the constitutional
component of standing is mandatory, assessment of the prudential component
is discretionary.'0 This section summarizes these two basic components
within the current federal standing doctrine.

4. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (recognizing standing as the "most
important" justiciability doctrine). The Court explained, "'In essence the question of standing
is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues."' Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
5. Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1364 (1973) (stating that the standing doctrine defines the "who" inquiry).
6. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of the Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 447 (1994) ("Justiciability
includes the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness .... ").
7. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Muskrat v. UnitedStates, 219 U.S. 346,355 (1911), noted
that the Constitution creates the Supreme Court and it cannot exercise any powers that are not
judicial in nature.
8. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 ("The case-or-controversy doctrine states fundamental limits on
federal judicial power in our system of government.").
9. The U.S. Supreme Court identified this two-fold inquiry in Warth v. Seldin.
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves
both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limits
on its exercise. In both dimensions it is founded in concern about the properand properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society.
Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 501.
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1. A ConstitutionalMinimum: The Article III "Case or Controversy"
Requirement
The constitutional component of standing originates under Article III,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which grants federal courts
jurisdiction over certain categories of "cases and controversies."" The "caseor-controversy" requirement is known as the "core component" of standing,
and potential litigants must satisfy this requirement before a federal court may
adjudicate their claim. 2 Litigation that does not present a valid case or
controversy is not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and, therefore,
must be dismissed because the litigant has not presented ajusticiable claim to
the court. 3
Through decisional law, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance in
1
defining a case or controversy. One early decision, Muskrat v. UnitedStates, 4
broadly defined a case or controversy as
the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination
by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom
for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
redress, or punishment of wrongs. . . . The term implies the
existence of present or possible adverse parties, whose contentions
are submitted to the court for adjudication.'
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a more specific explanation of
what standing has come to mean under the case-or-controversy requirement
11. Article III, Section 2 reads in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treatises made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies
between two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State ....
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that "the core
component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III").
13. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 ("The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on
federal judicial power in our system of government."); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99
(stating that Article III requires litigants to allege "'such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy' as to warrant... invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of
the court's remedial powers on [the plaintiff's) behalf") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
14. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
15. Id. at 357.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 56:177

in Bennett v. Spear.'6 In Bennett, the Court applied a three-part inquiry to
judge whether a claim presents ajusticiable controversy as required by Article
III." 7 First, the plaintiff must show evidence of a concrete, particularized, and
imminent "injury in fact"'" that is not speculative, conjectural, or
hypothetical. 9 Second, the injury must be caused by the defendant's conduct
rather than the result of a third party not before the court.2" Third, a favorable
judgment from the court must be likely to redress the alleged injury.2
"Injury in fact," causation, and redressability compose the three elements
that the Article III case-or-controversy requirement mandates to demonstrate
standing in federal court.22 A federal court has no power to hear a claim if the
party seeking review fails to satisfy this "constitutional minimum."23 Even if
a plaintiff satisfies these Article III requirements, however, a court may
nonetheless deny standing based on certain prudential restrictions.2 4

16. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
17. In Bennett, the Court analyzed the fundamental elements of the standing doctrine.
To satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article III, which is the
"irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff must, generally
speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered "injury in fact," that the injury is "fairly
traceable" to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be
redressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at 162 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)); see also Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984) (applying similar three-part test); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
109 (1983) (same); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (same); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (same).
18. Warth, 422 U.S. at 508 (asserting that a plaintiff must allege specific, concrete facts
showing that the challenged action harms him personally).
19. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109 (requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate alive and active claim).
20. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42 (stating that the case-or-controversy limit of Article III
requires federal courts to redress only those injuries that are traceable to the defendant's action
and to refrain from addressing those injuries that result from the actions of an absent party).
21. Id. at 38 (stating that the proper question when assessing a plaintiff's standing is
"whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision").
22. Id.
23. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (noting that standing is the "threshold question in every
federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit"); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that the doctrine of standing serves to
"identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process").
24. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) ("In addition to the immutable
requirements of Article Ill, 'the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential
principles that bear on the question of standing."') (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ans. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982)).
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2. Court-CreatedPrudentialConsiderations
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements imposed by Article
III, a court may deny a plaintiff access to the federal court system based on
judicially created "prudential limitations."25 The prudential aspect of standing
addresses the issue of judicial self-governance or jurisdictional restraint.26
When the exercise ofjurisdiction would be unwise, federal courts may invoke
these prudential limitations and decline to review a claim."
For example, courts may decline to review a claim brought by an uninjured
party on behalfof an injured thirdparty. This restriction, known as the jus
tertii rule, requires a plaintiff to assert only her own interests, not those of
third parties.28 Another prudential limitation restricts claims based on
generalized grievances. "[W]hen the asserted harm is a 'generalized
grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise ofjurisdiction."29
Additionally, courts may require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
representative branches of government would not better address her injury,
and that her injury falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute or
constitutional guarantee upon which she bases the claim.3" Whereas
constitutional standing requirements are mandatory,3' prudential rules are
25. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 ("This [standing] inquiry involves both constitutional
limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.").
26. Id.at 500 (stating that without rules such as "judicial self-governance," courts would
be forced to decide important issues without the benefit of concrete presentation).
27. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976) (declining to invoke third-party
limitation where it would cause inefficient use of judicial resources).
28. Id.at 193 (explaining that the jus tertii limitation keeps courts from intervening when
issues are "ill-defined and speculative").
29. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)
(finding that a plaintiff who local police had choked into unconsciousness lacked standing to
seek an injunction against similar treatment in the future). The Court explained:
Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way, [the
plaintiff] is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los
Angeles; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who
no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are
unconstitutional.
Id.
30. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("Standing doctrine embraces several
judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as ...the requirement
that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked."); see
also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
31. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (classifying the three-fold standing inquiry of "injury in fact,"
causation, and redressability as a "minimum constitutional mandate").
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court created and, therefore, may be overruled by an act of Congress or
ignored by the presiding court.32
To summarize, a party must have standing to obtain federal judicial review
by satisfying the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.
These requirements are met when a party alleges (1) a judicially cognizable
injury (2) caused by the alleged conduct and (3) capable of being redressed
through the requested relief. Even if a party sufficiently satisfies these
constitutionally required standing components, however, a court may
nevertheless deny review based on judicially created prudential considerations
that prohibit some claims by third parties, as well as the litigation of
generalized grievances.
B. Justifications for Standing Requirements in Federal Court
Courts and commentators commonly suggest two rationales for imposing
a standing requirement on potential litigants seeking access to the federal
judiciary. First, the standing requirement addresses the principle of separation
of powers.33 Second, the standing requirement protects the balance between
federal and state governments by reinforcing principles of federalism.34
1. Separationof Powers: Defining Judicial Responsibility Under
Article III
The separation of powers principle constitutes one justification for
imposing the case-or-controversy requirement on potential claims that come
before a federal court.3" Separation of powers addresses the "concern about
the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic
society."36 By allowing federal courts to adjudicate only valid cases or
controversies as required by Article 1II, federal courts respect the separation
of powers, by not unnecessarily interfering with other branches of
government.37
32. Id. at 501 ("Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise
would be barred by prudential standing rules.").
33. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51 (asserting that all doctrines surrounding Article III can be
understood as serving a single idea - the separation of powers).
34. Brian A. Stern, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal "Case or Controversy"
Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 77, 98 (1994) (explaining the role of
federalism in applying the case-or-controversy requirement in federal cases, stating "Supreme
Court cases implement federalism principles by respecting the structure of state governments
when interpreting the Constitution").
35. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51.
36. Id. at 750.
37. Article III, Section 1 reads:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
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In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Allen v. Wright, 38 wherein the
Court clearly articulated the significance of separation of powers within the
standing doctrine.3 9 In Allen, the Supreme Court denied standing to parents
of African American public school students who alleged that the IRS
wrongfully granted tax-exempt status to schools with racially discriminatory
practices.'4 Because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a concrete "injury in
fact," the Court declined to review the merits of the case.4 ' Perhaps more
importantly, the Court contributed further insight into the purpose of the
federal standing requirement, noting that the standing requirements served to
ensure a separation of powers between the branches of government.42 The
U.S. Supreme Court explained:
To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require
a court to rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract
would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort
the role of the Judiciaryin its relationshipto the Executive andthe
Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of
providing "government by injunction."4' 3
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ I.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution expressly set out distinct powers for each branch of
government in defining each branch in Articles I, II, and IIof the Federal Constitution. This
defining process inherently created a separation ofpowers without using such express language.
For example, Article III,
Section 1 creates the Supreme Court of the United States and grants
Congress authority to create additional courts as necessary. The salary and tenure provisions
for federal judges follow in this section, whereby federal judges are guaranteed life tenure and
assurance that Congress may not reduce their salaries during their service on the bench.
Because the salary and tenure provisions limit congressional influence and allow federal judges
liberal independence, Section Inot only definesjudicial authority, but also imposes constraints
on congressional authority over the federal judiciary.
38. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
39. Id. at 759 ("The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains
why our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents' alleged injury 'fairly can be traced to
the challenged action' ofthe IRS.") (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41 (1976)).
40. Id.at 739-40.
41. See id. at 753.
42. Id. at 752 ("[Tlhe standing inquiry must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion
that federal courts may exercise power only.., when adjudication is 'consistent with a system
of separated powers ..."')
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
43. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,222 (1974) (emphasis
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Separation of powers is arguably the strongest rationale behind the case-orcontroversy requirement." The obligation ofpotential litigants to demonstrate
standing through the Article III case-or-controversy requirement operates as
a "fundamental limit[] on federal judicial power in our system of
government, '4' ensuring that federal courts do not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.46 Consequently, federal
courts preserve separation of powers principles by only exercising thej udicial
power granted in Article III of the U.S. Constitution and by only adjudicating
claims brought by litigants able to demonstrate standing under the case-orcontroversy requirement.
2. Federalism: The Concern with Federal and State Autonomy
A second justification for imposing the case-or-controversy requirement is
to maintain a division of powers between federal and state governments. 7 By
definition, federalism should operate to constrain the scope ofjudicial power
in cases that call into question the appropriate boundary between state and
national affairs. 4' Federalism principles encourage federal courts to provide
a "check" on federal-state relations by denying federal judicial review when
the issues presented are better resolved by the states.4
To sustain principles of federalism, the doctrine of standing limits the reach
of federal judicial power as it relates to respect for individual state
governments.5 0 By refusing to hear cases that do not meet the case-orcontroversy requirement, Article III courts afford states the necessary
independence to remedy violations of law through the political process
established by the citizens ofthe state, rather than byjudicial decree mandated
by the federal government and invoked by the private citizen. 5 The U.S.
Supreme Court, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 2 noted that the "federal
added).
44. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.

45. Id. at 750.
46. Flast,392 U.S. at 95.
47. See Stern, supranote 34, at 98.
48. Edward Rubin, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REv. 1433, 1434 (1997) (defining
federalism as "a system where particular distributions of authority between a nation and its subunits are secured by definitive rights that the sub-units can assert against the central
government").
49. Id.
50. Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1898 (observing that the combined effects of standing,
mootness, deferential review, and equitable restraints on injunctive relief limit the reach of
federal judicial power with respect to state and local governments).
51. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
52. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss1/8
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courts must recognize '[t]he special delicacy of adjustment to be preserved
53
between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law."
In summary, the standing requirement derives from the case-or-controversy
language in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and serves two
primary rationales: (1) standing ensures the preservation of separation of
powers; and (2) standing guarantees the observation of federalism concerns.
C. Federal Standing Requirements Not Mandatory in State Courts
Although standing is a fundamental requirement that federal courts must
apply, the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly indicated that individual states are
not obligated to apply these federal standing requirements to determine who
is entitled to state judicial review. In ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,5 4 the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed an Arizona state case that a federal court would have
dismissed for the plaintiff's lack of standing had it arisen in federal court."
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, alleging that a state statute regarding
mineral leases of state land did not return the value for the lease as required. 6
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the state trial court's ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs." On review, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that ASARCO
presented a "difficult question about [its] own jurisdiction, a matter which
.touches on essential aspects of the proper relation between state and federal
' Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme
courts."58
Court's decision. But more significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court's
53. Id. at 112 (alteration in original) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120
(1951)). In Lyons, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review an appeal requesting injunctive
relief from actions taken by Los Angeles law enforcement agents based on "the need [to
.maintain] a proper balance between state and federal authority." Id.
54. 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (acknowledging that because Article III constraints do not bind
statejudiciaries, they need not follow the case-or-controversy limitation that federal courts must
recognize).
55. Id. at 616-17 ("Our review [of the cases] discloses no basis on which to find that
respondents would satisfy the requirements for federal standing articulated by our precedents.
It follows that the suit would have been dismissed at the outset were the federal rule to apply.").
56. Id at 610.
57. In ASARCO, the defendant challenged plaintiffs to bring the claim in federal court;
however, the court found jurisdiction to be proper and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The
defendant ultimately appealed the decision on jurisdictional grounds to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which affirmed the district court's jurisdictional ruling. Id. at 605. The two lease holders then
sought a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which also found jurisdiction to be proper.
Id.
58. Id. at 609. The difficult question arose because individual taxpayers and the Arizona
Education Association, which represented Arizona public school teachers, brought suit in state
courts challenging a state statute governing mineral leases on states' lands as contrary to the
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910, as well as the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 610.
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pronouncement enhanced federal standing jurisprudence by affirming a state
court decision that did not apply the federal standing requirement.
The ASARCO decision set the stage for both extensive criticism and raving
praise regarding standing requirements in statejudicial systems. 9 The Court,
however, was unanimous in concluding that federal standing principles do not
bind state courts. 60 Despite this decision, many state courts base their
respective standing requirements on the federal standing doctrine. 6' This note
now turns to the past and current state of the standing requirements in
Oklahoma and addresses the impact of federal standing law on Oklahoma
jurisprudence.
II. Review of Standing Jurisprudencein Oklahoma
A. Development of Oklahoma Standing Law
The concept of standing evolved in the Oklahoma judicial system from
several common law phraseologies applied by state courts to assess whether
a plaintiff's claim warranted judicial review.62 In general, standing in
Oklahoma refers to the legal rights of a person to challenge the conduct of
another in ajurisdictional forum. 63 Either a party to the litigation or the court
on its own motion may raise standing inquiries at any stage of the judicial
59. See e.g., Stem, supra note 34 (praising the U.S. Supreme Court's decision allowing
states to define independently standing requirements).
60. The ASARCO Court noted that
the state judiciary here... took no account of federal standing rules in letting the
case go to final judgment in the Arizona courts. That result properly follows from
the allocation of authority in the federal system. We have recognized often that the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state
courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal
rules ofjusticiability ....
ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617.
61. See generally Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1838 (discussing the conformance of many
state judiciaries to the federal justiciability model).
62. Assessment of a plaintiff's right to judicial review in Oklahoma courts first began as
an inquiry into the "proper party plaintiff." See infra Part III.A. 1. Oklahoma courts have also
applied a "real party in interest" test in examining a plaintiff's opportunity to be heard in state
court. More recently, however, the inquiry has turned to whether the plaintiff presents himself
as an "aggrieved party" before the court. See infra Part llI.A.2.
63. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 1985 OK 93, 1 7, 742 P.2d 1059, 1062 ("When
standing of a party is brought into issue, the focus is on the party... and not on the issues he
wishes to have adjudicated.") (citing Democratic Party ofOkla. v. Estep, 1982 OK 106, 5,652
P.2d 271, 274; In re State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 1982 OK 36, 7, 646 P.2d 605, 609); see
also State ex rel. Cartwright v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 1982 OK 146, 5, 653 P.2d 1230, 1232
("'Standing' is the right to commence litigation.., for ultimate adjudication by a court or
jury.").
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process.' 4 Although today Oklahoma applies the same detailed standing
analysis as required in the federal court system, 6" originally Oklahoma applied
more generalized methods to assess who could rightfully seek state judicial
review. This section considers several cases that illustrate the development
of Oklahoma law in defining a judicial-access requirement that would
eventually mirror the federal standing doctrine.
1. Laying the Foundation: The Requirement of the "ProperParty
Plaintiff"
Oklahoma courts initially required that a "proper party plaintiff" present his
claim to the court. For example, in Baugh v. Little,66 the plaintiff sought to
recover money from trustees and officers of a consolidated school district,
alleging that the monies had been illegally paid out of the school district
funds.67 The plaintiff based his right to relief on his status as a resident
taxpayer in the school district during the time the school district allegedly
mishandled the funds.6 When the claim reached the court for resolution,
however, the plaintiff had moved out of the school district.69 The trial court
dismissed the claim "for want of a proper party plaintiff," and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court affirmed.7"
The court noted, "'The rule must be regarded as fundamental, that no
person can maintain an action respecting a subject-matter, in respect to which
he has no interest, right or duty, either personal or fiduciary."'' This rule of
law laid the foundational requirement for parties to demonstrate particular,
individualized injuries to obtain access to Oklahoma courts.72

64. In re Estate of Doan, 1986 OK 15, T 5, 727 P.2d 574, 576.
65. See Toxic Waste Impact Group v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, 19, 890 P.2d 906, 910 n.7
("[I]n that our standing standards are analogous to those pronounced by the United States
Supreme Court its jurisprudence on the subject is instructive.") (citing Hendrick v. Waiters,
1993 OK 162, 8, 865 P.2d 1232, 1237 n.14).
66. 1929 OK 383, 282 P. 459.
67. Id. 1-2, 282 P. at 459.
68. Id. 7, 282 P. at 459-60.
69. Id. 7, 282 P. at 460.
70. Id. 24, 282 P. at 462.
71. Id. 23, 282 P. at 462 (quoting Baxter v. Baxter, 10 A. 814, 816 (N.J. Ch. 1887)).
72. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., v. Assocs. Transps., Inc., 1973 OK 62,512 P.2d
137 (requiring the real party in interest to determine who is entitled to proceWds of litigation);
Schmidt v. Nash, 1950 OK 42,217 P.2d 830 (same); Nelson v. Garrett, 1948 OK 259,200 P.2d
420 (stating that a "proper party plaintiff" is one who has an interest in the subject matter of an
action and has demanded relief); Helmerich & Payne, Inc., v. Keeney, 1936 OK 638, 61 P.2d
709 (same).
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2. Closer to FederalStanding: State Courts Require "Aggrieved
Party" Status
The Oklahoma judiciary ultimately changed the "proper party plaintiff"
analysis to require that the plaintiff demonstrate "aggrieved party" status. In
73 Cleary Petroleum
the 1980 case of Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison,
Corporation sought to quiet title to an oil and gas property interest obtained
through its business dealings.7 4 The trial court declared the interest a
leasehold, and Cleary Petroleum appealed." Before reviewing the merits of
the trial court's ruling, the Oklahoma Supreme Court first considered whether
it could properly consider Cleary Petroleum an "aggrieved party," thereby
entitled to judicial review.76
The court began with the general assertion that a party appealing must be
one who is personally aggrieved." The court then defined an aggrieved party
as "one whose pecuniary interest in the subject-matter is directly and
injuriously affected. 7' 8 Further, the court found that to qualify as an aggrieved
party, the effect of a judgment by the court must be "direct, substantial and
immediate, rather than contingent on some future event."' 79 In applying these
rules, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that Cleary Petroleum qualified as
an aggrieved party.
The requirement that plaintiffs must establish "aggrieved party" status is
well settled in Oklahoma case law." The decision in Clearly Petroleum is
notable, however, in that the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied two
73. 1980 OK 188, 621 P.2d 528.
74. See id. I 1-3, 621 P.2d at 530.
75. Id.
76. Id. 4-7, 621 P.2d at 530-31.
77. Id. 4, 621 P.2d at 530 ("One who is not aggrieved by a court's decision - however
erroneous - may not bring an appeal from it."); see also Whitman v. Whitman, 1964 OK 259,
397 P.2d 664; Grand Lodge of Okla. v. Webb, 1956 OK 342, 306 P.2d 340; Love v. Wilson,
1938 OK 57,75 P.2d 876; Swan v. Home Say. & State Bank, 1931 OK 97, 297 P. 250; Tinch
v. State ex rel. Shull, 1931 OK 98, 297 P. 251; Corley v. French, 1930 OK 492, 293 P. 177.
78. Cleary Petroleum, 4, 621 P.2d at 530 (citing Sarkeys v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 40, 1979
OK 42, 19,592 P.2d 529,536; Steincamp v. Steincamp, 1979OK 5I, 3,593 P.2d 495,497).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first defined an aggrieved party in Love v. Wilson, 1 4, 75
P.2d at 878, as "one whose pecuniary interest is directly affected or whose right of property is
established or divested by the decree."
79. Cleary Petroleum, 3, 621 P.2d at 530.
80. See, e.g., Davis v. Fieker, 1997 OK 156,952 P.2d 505 (assessing standing of plaintiffs
seeking to enforce state abortion statute); Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co. v. Okla., 1985 OK 108, 712
P.2d 40 (noting that standing to appeal a Corporation Commission order is granted only to
persons deeming themselves aggrieved); Nat'l Motor Club ofOkla., Inc., v. State Ins. Bd., 1964
OK 138, 393 P.2d 511 (addressing whether National Motor Club qualified as an aggrieved party
before reaching the merits of the appeal).
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components of the federal standing requirement, although without reference
to federal law.8 First, requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate "aggrieved party"
status parallels the federal standing requirement that litigants exhibit a
concrete, particularized "injury in fact." 2 Additionally, ClearlyPetroleumset
forth the requirement that the court's judgment must render an "immediate
effect."83 This terminology corresponds to the redressability component under
federal standing requirements.
B. Oklahoma'sAdherence to FederalStandingJurisprudence
By 1982, the Oklahoma Supreme Court clearly applied federal standing
requirements to evaluate a potential litigant's ability to seek state court
review. In three relatively recent cases, the court comprehensively evaluated
Oklahoma standing requirements through the guidance and application of the
federal standing doctrine."4
1. Oklahoma Implements FederalStanding Principles
The Oklahoma Supreme Court began to implement federal standing
principles with Independent School DistrictNo. 9 v. Glass.85 In Glass, the
Tulsa School District (the District) sought to enjoin a tax refund from Ford
Motor Company authorized by the State Board of Tax-Roll Corrections. 6 The
District claimed that the refund was illegal because Ford failed to follow
proper procedures in paying the tax. 7 Ford countered with the contention that
the District lacked standing to prosecute the appeal.88 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court first examined the standing question, stating, "Because the issue of
standing is critical to the prosecution of the appeal by the District, it must be
resolved before the merits can be reached." 89

81. Cleary Petroleum, 4, 621 P.2d at 530 (assessing whether litigant's interests were
"injuriously affected" to determine standing).
82. The assessment of the plaintiff's "aggrieved party" status in Cleary Petroleum mirrors
the federal requirement of "injury in fact" in that the court required "injuriously affected"
interests. Id.
83. Id.("The effect of a judgment must be direct, substantial and immediate, rather than
contingent on some future event.").
84. In Part III, this note further explains the Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions of
Independent School District No. 9 v. Glass, Hendrick v. Walters and Toxic Waste Impact
Group, Inc. v. Leavitt.
85. 1982 OK 2, 639 P.2d 1233.
86. Id. 5-6, 639 P.2d at 1236.
87. Id. 7,639 P.2d at 1236.
88. Id.
89. Id. 7, 639 P.2d at 1236-37.
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The court turned to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Baker v. Carr9
and Warth v. Seldin9 to assess the District's standing. The court noted that
"the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,"92 and whether the plaintiff
has asserted "his/her own legal rights," and not the "rights or interests of third
parties."93 The court continued its standing analysis by applying the three-part
test necessary to demonstrate standing in Article III courts.94
Because the District sought to prevent an illegal refund of public funds
erroneously authorized by the Board ofTax-Roll Corrections, the court agreed
that the District had a direct and pecuniary interest in the refund.95 The court
also found that the District's attempt to protect revenue from illegal and
arbitrary action of the Board was legitimate.96 Therefore, the court found that
the District had standing to seek injunctive relief.97
The court's decision in Glass provides the first concrete example of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's adoption of the exact language associated with
the federal standing requirements. Several Oklahoma cases requiring an
inquiry into the plaintiff's standing promptly followed this decision, each also
subscribing to the federal standing requirement adopted in Glass.9" The Glass
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Glass, 8, 639 P.2d at 1237 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 204).
Id. 9, 639 P.2d at 1237 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
Before a litigant possesses standing as a proper party to seek ... relief, it must be
alleged that: the challenged action has caused him/her injury in fact; the relief
sought would remedy the injury; and, the interest sought to be protected is within
the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute in question.... The
proper inquiry concerning standing is whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered
injury to a legally protected interest .... If he has not, standing does not exist,
and the case must be dismissed. If standing exists, the case must proceed on the
merits.
Id. 10, 639 P.2d at 1237 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Ass'n of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
95. Id. I, 639 P.2d at 1238.
96. Id.
97. The court stated, "The District has an interest in the subject matter, the capacity to sue,
and the power to protect and prevent the wrongful disposition of revenues." Id. (emphasis
added).
98. See Democratic Party v. Estep, 1982 OK 106,652 P.2d 271 (evaluating standing of the
Democratic Party via federal standing principles and determining that the presented claim did
not qualify as ajusticiable controversy); In re State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 1982 OK 36, 646
P.2d 605 (employing federal standing requirements to conclude that the Department of
Transportation had standing to challenge the Railroad Revitalization Act through application
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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decision illustrates the merger of Oklahoma's standing requirements with the
federal standing doctrine.
2. FederalAnalysis "Instructive" in Assessing Standing Under
Oklahoma Law
The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the federal standing doctrine
instrumental in determining the plaintiff s standing in Hendrick v.Walters.9 9
In Hendrick, the court considered whether the Governor had forfeited his
office by failing to take an oath in the form prescribed by the provisions of an
Oklahoma statute. The plaintiff brought the claim as a state lawmaker in his
representational capacity."° The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the
legislator had standing, and thus a justiciable claim, because he was able to
show "both a plain, direct and legitimate interest in having [the] court's
declaration upon the tendered issue and a personal stake in the outcome."''
In resolving the Hendrick dispute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court began its
analysis with an obvious application of the federal standing requirements,
asserting that Oklahoma's standing requirements were "analogous" to those
defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. °2 The court described both the
constitutional and prudential aspects of standing as defined by the U.S.
Supreme Court and also articulated the three-part case-or-controversy test of
(1) "injury in fact," (2) causation, and (3) redressability.'0 3
of federal standing requirements).
99. 1993 OK 162, 865 P.2d 1232.
100. Id. 5, 865 P.2d at 1236. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, "[A] legislator can
claim no elevated status in establishing standing. The lawmaker must meet the same threshold
criteria required of any other litigant." Id.
(footnote omitted) (citing Harrington v. Bush, 553
F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
Justice Opala discussed legislator standing in his dissent in Campbell v. White, 1993 OK
89,
15-20, 856 P.2d 255, 263 (Opala, J., dissenting). Justice Opala noted that "in order to
satisfy the constitutional aspect [of standing] some type of redressable injury must be alleged.
Injuries suffered by legislators fall within three basic categories: (1) diluted vote, (2) usurpation
of legislative-power, and (3) diminished effectiveness in carrying out legislative duties absent
ajudicial declaration." Id.16, 856 P.2d at 266-67 (Opala, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
For a full discussion on legislator standing, see Ernest A. Benck, Jr., Standingfor State and
FederalLegislators, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 811 (1983).
101. Hendrick, 6, 865 P.2d at 1238 ("The controversy is lively, real and the requirement
ofjusticiability hence clearly met.").
102. Id. 5 n.14, 865 P.2d at 1236 n.14. ("Since our standing standards are analogous to
those pronounced by the United States Supreme Court, the latter's jurisprudence is instructive.
A litigant must overcome two threshold hurdles: "'constitutionallimitations of federal courts'
jurisdiction and prudentiallimitations on its exercise."') (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975)).
103. In assessing the plaintiff's standing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court required
that (1) an actual or threatened injury (sometimes called injury-in-fact) has
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Thus, the Hendrick court clearly adhered to federal principles of standing.
The following case reemphasized the importance of the Hendrickdecision and
solidified the federal standing requirement derived from Article III's case-orcontroversy requirement as part of Oklahoma jurisprudence.
3. Confirming Oklahoma's Commitment to FederalStanding
Requirements
Most recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed its reliance on
federal standing requirements in the case of Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc.
v. Leavitt.'°4 In Leavitt, Toxic Waste Impact Group (TWIG) sought to void a
construction permit issued by the Oklahoma State Health Department to
Environmental Solutions, Inc. (ESI) allowing ESI to build a hazardous waste
injection well."0 5 Leavitt challenged TWIG's standing to assert the claim, and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court,
providing guidance for the trial court to resolve the standing issue.0 6
The court first began its standing analysis by citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, and observing that "the party invoking a court's jurisdiction has the
burden of establishing his or her standing (when contested) to pursue the
action in court."'0 7 The Oklahoma Supreme Court again referred to the U.S.
Supreme Court's standing requirements as "instructive" in defining standing
The court explained the three-part case-orunder Oklahoma law.'
controversy requirement of standing as well as the corresponding prudential
limitations and asserted that the case could proceed to the merits only after
meetings these requirements. 0 9
Interestingly, Justice Opala's concurrence in Leavitt notes the fundamental
differences between state and federal standing analysis."' Justice Opala
occurred, (2) some relief for the harm can be given, and (3) the interest to be
guarded is within a statutorily or constitutionally protected zone. Not only is
standing confined to those whose interest in the controversy is "direct, immediate
and substantial," a litigant must also have a personal stake in the outcome.
Id. 5, 865 P.2d at 1236 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Underside v. Lathrop, 1982 OK 57, 17,
645 P.2d 514, 517).
104. 1994 OK 148, 890 P.2d 906.
105. Id. 2, 890 P.2d at 908-09.
106. Id. 9 5, 890 P.2d at 909.
107. Id. 8, 890 P.2d at 910 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992)).
108. Id. 8 n.7, 980 P.2d at 911 n.7 ("[1]n that our standing standards are analogous to those
pronounced by the United States Supreme Court its jurisprudence on the subject is instructive.")
(citing Hendrick, 7 n.14, 865 P.2d at 1236 n.14).
109. ld. 9 8-9, 890 P.2d at 910-11.
110. Id. 9 1, 890 P.2d at 914 (Opala, J., concurring) ("I write separately (a) to reemphasize
the distinctions between federal and state standing concepts and (b) to [clarify] the
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points to the fact that Oklahoma courts are not bound by the same
constitutional provisions as federal courts."' Although Justice Opala's
comments do not represent the majority opinion, the articulation of these
important differences by a member of Oklahoma's highest court is significant.
Justice Opala's assertions provide the foundation for further analysis and
suggestions addressed in Part IV of this note.
C. Denialof JudicialReview to Oklahoma Citizens Based on Federal
Standing
The previous section assessed Oklahoma's close alignment with standing
requirements set forth by federal courts. This section now turns to specific
instances in which Oklahoma courts have denied judicial review to plaintiffs
by applying federal standing principles.
1. Declining Review Based on Component One: Inability to Show
"Injury in Fact"
Oklahoma courts routinely deny judicial review based on a litigant's
inability to demonstrate a concrete "injury in fact," the first component of
federal and Oklahoma standing requirements. ' 2 For example, Underside v.
Lathrop"3 involved a plaintiffs challenge to a judgment rendered in a
disagreement between a homeowner and insurer. The court declined to review
the case, finding that the insurer lacked standing, and thus had no appealable
interest, as evidenced by his inability to show a "direct, immediate and
substantial" injury." 4 Relying on the first component of standing- "injury
misimpression that in the state legal system standing has a 'jurisdictional'dimension.")
(footnotes omitted).
11l. Id. 2,4,890 P.2d at 914, 915 (Opala, J., concurring) ("The U.S. Constitution, Article
Ill, has long been held to require that a 'case' or 'controversy' is essential to invoke federal
judicialjurisdiction.... Oklahoma's constitution has no case-or-controversy clause.").
112. See, e.g., Macy v. Okla. City Sch. Dist. No. 89, 1998 OK 58, 17, 961 P.2d 804, 808
(denying private individuals standing to challenge the creation of a school district because the
individuals "do not seek relief based upon alleged injuries"); Herring v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax
8, 894 P.2d 1074, 1076 (declining standing to challenge the
Comm'n, 1995 OK 28,
constitutionality of Workers' Compensation amendment because "[t]he plaintiff has not shown
he has suffered any injury .... Thus, the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action.").
Long before the Supreme Court announced federal standing requirements, however,
Oklahoma courts imposed this condition to seek state judicial review. See Rea v. State ex rel.
Bd. of Comm'r of Lincoln County, 1911 OK 423, 16, 119 P. 235, 237 ("It is a settled rule that
before a party is in position to assail the constitutionality of a statute he must be affected or
injured by its enforcement.").
113. 19820K57,645P.2d514.
114. The court noted:
Standing to prosecute an appeal must be predicated on that interest in the trial
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in fact" - the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to consider the merits of the
claim presented in Underside."5
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also invoked the first standing
component in declining to consider state initiative petitions. For instance, in
In re Initiative Petition No. 363,' 16 the court considered a proposal to the
electorate for a new constitutional article that would legalize and regulate
casino gambling. State citizens challenged the constitutionality of the
petition, primarily focusing on the petition's alleged adverse impact on casino
gambling on Indian land." 7
The court found that all of the issues pressed by the plaintiff "relate to
possible impacts of 1P 363 on Indian tribes and on federalgaming law."'"18
The court reasoned that because the petition had not yet adversely impacted
a tribe, the plaintiff based the alleged injury on premature speculation and not
an actual injury.'
Looking to the requirement that a plaintiff present a
controversy that is "direct, immediate and substantial,"' 20 the court declined
to reach the merits of the challenge because "no one before [the court had]
standing to challenge the measure's validity."''
2. DecliningReview Based on Component Two: Inability to Show
Causation
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also denied review to plaintiffs unable
to demonstrate element two of the standing requirement- causation between
the alleged wrong and the challenged action. To illustrate, in Turley v. Flag-

Id.

court's decision which is direct, immediate and substantial. Conjecture or
speculation about possible adverse consequences that may flow from the decision
at some point in the future will not suffice to support a person's "aggrieved"
status. One cannot appeal from a decision, however erroneous, which does not
affect one's substantial rights.
7, 645 P.2d at 517 (footnote omitted).

115. Id.
116. 19960K 122, 927 P.2d 558.
117. The plaintiff contended that the measure would (I) "impermissibly restrict casino
gaming on Indian lands," (2) "be enforced on Indian land by state legislation and by gaming
personnel," (3) subject Indian tribes to a 10% tax on gaming proceeds, and (4) require gambling
casinos in Indian country to conform to mandated physical construction specifications. Id. 8,
927 P.2d at 563-64.
118. /d. 12, 927 P.2d at 565.
119. Id.
120. See id T 13 n.29, 927 P.2d at 565 n.29 ("Not only is standing confined to those whose
interest in the controversy is 'direct, immediate and substantial,' but a litigant must also have
a personal stake in the outcome.") (citations omitted).
121. Id. 13, 927 P.2d at 565.
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Redfern Oil Co., 2 ' a land surface owner sought to reopen and stay a
Corporation Commission order, hoping to change the spacing units before oil
drilling began under his land.' The Corporation Commission asserted that
the surface owner lacked standing to bring the claim.' 24 The plaintiff
contended that, as a landowner, he had a personal stake in the actions taken
Commission, thereby making him a proper party to seek
by the Corporation
25
review.'
judicial
The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, however, stating that "[i]n order
to meet the status required for standing, a party must have a 'personal stake'
in the litigation because of an actual or threateneddistinct injury which has
a causalconnection between the alleged wrong and the actions challenged.' 2 6
Essentially, the court applied the first two standing concepts, "injury in fact"
and causation, ultimately findingthat the plaintiff could not establish standing
based on these two requirements. Therefore, the plaintiff's challenge did not
present ajusticiable controversy, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined
to review the claim.
3. Declining Review Based on Component Three: Inability to Redress
the Injury
The third component of federal standing - redressability - also provides
a basis to decline review of claims in Oklahoma courts. For example, in Cities
Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 27 two attorneys petitioned the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to review nonmonetary sanctions imposed on them by a trial
judge during the course of their representation of Gulf Oil Corporation. The
trial judge's sanctions restricted the manner in which the attorneys could
represent their client during trial. 128 The attorneys asserted that the judge's

122. 1989OK 144, 782 P.2d 130.
123. Id. % 3-7, 782 P.2d at 133.
124. Id. 10, 782 P.2d at 134.
125. Id.
126. Id. 12, 782 P.2d at 134 (emphasis added) (citing Simon v. EasternKentucky Welfare
Rights Organization,426 U.S. 26, 41(1976), and Seal v. Corp. Commission, 1986 OK 34, %1
5-6, 725 P.2d 278, 283, in the application of the "injury in fact" and causation requirements of
federal and state standing).
The court noted, "As a surface owner, [the plaintiff] is not a competent party to prosecute
an appeal from the Corporation Commission's order ....His pecuniary interest in the subject
Id.
22, 782 P.2d at
I..."
matter of the appeal has not been directly and injuriously affected .
138.

127. 1999 OK 16, 976 P.2d 545.
128. Id. 7, 976 P.2d at 548.
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sanctions, along with her comments to the local media, damaged their
professional reputations.' 29
Without reaching the merits of the claim, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
denied review to the two attorneys, basing its decision on component three of
the standing analysis - redressability.'30 Citing Toxic Waste Impact Group,
Inc. v. Leavitt as well as Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the court emphasized
the requirement that there must be "a likelihood, as opposed to mere
speculation,that the injury will be redressedby afavorabledecision."'3' The
court determined that even a favorable decision would only provide a
"meaningless declaration" that would not provide an adequate remedy to
redress the complained of injury; "[h]ence, the third component of standing
[was] missing."''
4. DecliningReview Based on PrudentialConsiderations
The reliance of Oklahoma courts on prudential limitations of the federal
standing doctrine also impedes access to the state court system. In
Gianfillippo v. Northland Casualty Co.,' the plaintiff was an injured
passenger in a car driven by a policyholder of Northland Casualty Company.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to hear a bad-faith claim against the
insurance company, reasoning that the policy was intended for the protection
of the insured.'3 4 The court labeled the plaintiff as "merely a third-party
claimant who lacked standing."' 35
Therefore, Oklahoma's application of federal standing requirements has
effectively closed the court house door to numerous plaintiffs. Although
Oklahoma courts should not grant standing to every potential litigant seeking
access to the courts, they should base denial of access on well-reasoned
principles, rather than just mechanically applying the federal standing
requirements created for Article III courts. Part IV of this note analyzes
Oklahoma's adherence to federal standing requirements and suggests that

129. Id. 2, 976 P.2d at 547.
130. Id. 13, 976 P.2d at 548-49 ("Without reaching the issue ... the appeal is dismissed
because the lawyers lack standing to pursue the matter. The Court cannot give them the
effectual relief which they seek ....Hence, the third component of the Toxic Waste standing
test cannot be satisfied.").
13 1. d. 3, 976 P.2d at 547.
132. Id. 8, 976 P.2d at 548; see also Dank v. Benson, 2000 OK 40, 5 P.3d 1088 (stating
that the plaintiff's claim did not present a question capable of specific relief from the court).
133. 1993 OK 125, 861 P.2d 308.
134. Id. 110, 861 P.2d at 310.
135. Id.; see also McFarland v. Atkins, 1979 OK 3, 594 P.2d 758 (declining to review a
claim based on plaintiff's status as third-party beneficiary).
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Oklahoma should more carefully construct a state standing doctrine that
responds to particular state issues and local concerns.
IV Analysis of Oklahoma's Standing Requirements
It seems unclear why very few states have constructed their own standing
doctrines; 136 consequently, this Part of the note examines a state's ability to
construct state standing doctrines independent of federal influence. The
analysis first evaluates why the justifications for imposing a federal standing
requirement in Article III courts - separation of powers and federalism - do
not necessarily contribute to the effective functioning of state government.
The analysis then asserts that Oklahoma citizens would benefit from the
Oklahoma Supreme Court reinstating and tailoring the standing requirements
applied by Oklahoma courts prior to the adoption of the federal standing
doctrine. Finally, the analysis concludes by addressing criticisms of statespecific standing principles.
A. DisparityBetween State and FederalSystems of Governance
The constitutional standing requirements of Article III address issues
peculiar to federal courts.' 7 In particular, the justifications for a federal
standing requirement address the need to preserve principles of federalism, as
well as the need to maintain a separation of powers between each branch of
IIIjudicial restraint,
the federal government. 38 These justifications of Article
39
however, do not necessarily apply to state judiciaries. 1
1. DiminishedForce of Federalismand Separationof Powers in State
Government
First, at the state level, separation of powers concerns do not operate with
the same force as in the federal system. One concept behind separation of
powers is that matters best determined by another branch of government
should be deferred to that branch for proper resolution. 4 Specifically, the
standing doctrine requires federal judges to decline to review cases that may
be more appropriately resolved through "political outlets" such as the
136. Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1905 (suggesting that many state courts follow federal
standing requirements because of the perceived dominance of Article Il1).
137. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 n.8 (1977) ("The
constitutional and prudential considerations canvassed at length in Warth v.Seldin respond to
concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature.") (citation omitted).
138. See Stem, supra note 34, at 83-92 (discussing the justifications for a standing
requirement in the federal system).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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legislative or executive branches of government."'4 In many states, however,
state judges are seen as part of the political process: they frequently have
legislative experience and they often sit for reelection. 4 ' Separation of
powers in the federal system encompasses the belief that the assignment of
important public matters belongs within the elected branches of government
because the elected branches are more politically accountable than unelected
federal judges.'4 3 The following subsection contends that this rationale,
though perhaps relevant in the federal judicial context, however, is
unconvincing in a state court system where the involvement of statejudges in
local government differs significantly from their federal counterparts.
Second, justiciability requirements, such as standing, operate at the federal
level to preserve principles of federalism by ensuring an appropriate balance
between state and national affairs.'" These federalism concerns do not
present themselves, however, at the state level where there is no system of
dual sovereignty.'4 5 In state government, individual cities and state counties
46
are creatures of the state, deriving their power from the state constitution.
In contrast, states are individual sovereigns in the federal system, maintaining
all rights not explicitly delegated to the federal government.'4 7 Additionally,
federalism principles address the concern that federal decisional law will
impact many or all citizens in the United States.'48 While the decision of an
Article IIIjudge may potentially bind people of many or all states, the decision
of a state judge binds only people of that state. This limited effect gives state
judicial decisions an increased sense of "democratic legitimacy and local
responsiveness than that of an unelected Article III 'outsider." 149 Therefore,
state court judges, free from the federalism constraints that bind their federal
counterparts, should not feel obligated to apply federal standing requirements
in their state courtrooms.

141. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) ("[T]he idea of separation of powers,
counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought ... to seek a restructuring of the
apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.").
142. Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1886-87.
143. Id. at 1883.
144. Rubin, supranote 48, at 1434.
145. Daniel B. Rodriquez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects,28 N.M. L. REV.
271, 278 (1998) ("Whereas states occupy an essential role in the American constitutional
system, there is no equivalent principle of federalism. .. in state constitutionalism.").
146. Id. at 278-80.
147. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
148. Rodriguez, supra note 145, at 278-80.
149. Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1902.
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2. Differing Role ofJudges in State Courts
The heightened accountability of judges within the state court system is
evidenced by the differing roles of a state court judge and an Article III
decision maker. Specifically, three key differences support the contention that
state court judges should adjudicate matters falling outside the scope of
federal standing requirements.
First, the accountability of state and federal judges differs as a result of
dissimilar selection and retention processes at the state and federal level. For
example, Article III provides appointed federal judges the mandatory
protections of life tenure and guaranteed salary protection to keep federal
courtrooms free of majoritarian pressure. 5
Because of the decisional
freedom afforded by these protections,' 5 ' Article III also imposes decisional
restrictions, like standing, that allow federal judges to hear only cases
involving valid cases or controversies. The case-or-controversy requirement
restricts the claims and claimants permitted in federal courts, thereby ensuring
the accountability of federal decision makers.' 52 In contrast, most state court
judges are without the protections of life tenure and guaranteed salary
protection. In fact, thirty-nine of the fifty states, including Oklahoma, "elect"
state judges through a process of judicial retention.'
Because of this fact,
states need to ensure the accountability of state judges with judicial access
requirements such as standing. The retention process allows state citizens to
review the conduct and practices of state judges.'5 4 This assessment of a state
judge's accountability directly relates to the will of the people, which may
eliminate judgeships'55 or decrease salary provisions through the local
legislative body. Therefore, local citizens, and not strict judicial access
156
requirements like standing, ensure the accountability of state courts.
150, Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule ofLaw,
62 U. Cn. L. REv. 689, 726-28 (1995) (discussing the protections afforded to Article III
judges).
151. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("The case-or-controversy doctrines state
fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government.").
152. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (.1975).
153. Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correctingthe
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court,50 ALA. L.REV. 397,414 (1999) (observing that
"[t]hirty-nine of the fifty states presently provide a measure ofpolitical accountability forjudges
through some form of election").
154. Id. at 405 (discussing the political accountability of state judges).
155. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § I.
156. It is interesting to note that in Oklahoma, the salaries ofjudges cannot be diminished
during their term of office. However, this does not prohibit salary modifications in between
terms. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § I I(a).
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Second, the constituency affected by a state judge's decision is typically
much smaller than the constituency affected by the decision of a federal judge
because state judicial districts tend to be smaller than their federal
counterparts.' 5 7 This leads some analysts to believe that "'state trialj udges are
likely to feel closer links to their local communities than federal judges,'
thereby enjoying a greater aura of democratic accountability."'5 8 A state
court's decision applies only within a single state and is based on the state's
laws and judicial precedent. Therefore, the decision of a state judge is more
likely to comport with the views of the people it affects.1 59 Because state
courts are responsible for a much smaller scope of activity than federal courts,
able to render decisions that respond to purely state
they are arguably better
60
or local concerns.
Third, the relative ease with which a state may amend its constitution
affords more room for judicial interpretation by state judges. At the federal
level, concerns that decisions made by Article III judges are final and beyond
revision leave federal judges little room for judicial interpretive error.' 6'
Amendments to state constitutions, however, take place with much greater
ease than amendments to the U.S. Constitution,' 62 therefore alleviating much
of the concern regarding the decision of a statejudge that strikes the populace
as amiss.
In conclusion, state judiciaries are well placed to make informed decisions
about local residents and their needs. Many state judges answer directly to
local citizens through the process ofjudicial retention elections. Also, smaller
judicial districts allow state judges to adapt their law-making policies to
correspond to local situations and preferences. Therefore, requiring every
plaintiff to demonstrate the strict federal judicial-access requirement of
standing may frequently deny state judicial assistance to plaintiffs with valid
157. Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1887.
158. Id. (quoting Donald W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State Court Review ofAdministrative
Action: Prescribingthe Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 542).
159. Id at 1902 n.368 ("'Whatever the validity ofthe concern, federal judges have occasionally been pictured as 'outsiders,' rendering their controversial decisions subject to more
resistance than an equally controversial opinion handed down by the 'local'judge."') (quoting
Burt Neubome, Toward ProceduralParity in ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 725, 732 (1981)).
160. Id. at 1887.
161. Id. at 1886. Hershkoff cites William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics
ofA nticipatoryAdjudication,23 J.LEGAL STUD. 683, 710 (1994), as it associates "the difficulty
of federal constitutional amendments with the need to minimize constitutional interpretive
error." Id. at 1886 n.279.
162. Id.(noting that at the state level, devices such as the initiative petition and referendum
help dilute some of the burden of finality typically associated with federal court decisions).
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claims. This defeats the ability of a publicly accountable state court system
effectively to shape and give content to state law. 163
B. Rationale and Recommendationfor a More State-Specific Standing
Doctrine in Oklahoma
1.Rationale: State ConstitutionalRights of Oklahoma Citizens
Although Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
federal courts to actual cases and controversies, the Oklahoma Constitution
contains no similar restraint. In fact, the Oklahoma Constitution is extremely
liberal in itsjudicial access language, suggesting the importance of protecting
the interests of each citizen, particularly concerning the right to seek relief in
state courts. Article 2, section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution contains an
open-court provision providing that "[t]he courts ofjustice of the State shall
be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every
wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right
and
' 64
justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice."'
Rather than imposing Article IIljusticiability guidelines, Oklahoma should
assess whether state judicial review could contribute to democratic life.
Democratic participation in public affairs includes more than just electoral
activity or voter turnout. Therefore, by allowing greater access to state courts
by adopting state-specific standing requirements, Oklahoma courts may afford
private citizens an increased role in public decision making. For example, a
more state-specific standing doctrine could provide Oklahoma citizens and the
judicial system a role in reducing partisan control over public resources.165 In
reviewing claims made by plaintiffs against special interest or rent-seeking
groups, courts could serve as a filtering device against such partisan behavior
atthe state and local levels. A more state-specific standing requirement would
allow courts to adjudicate claims that federal courts would deny under the
complex federal standing requirements. As a result, the state court system
could cooperate in local policy making by responding to citizens' concerns in
the judicial system.
The differing roles of federal and state judges, along with Oklahoma's
open-court provision, emphasize that Oklahoma courts should not ignore
potential plaintiffs who present legitimate claims that the state legal system
may effectively address. In redefining the state standing requirement,
however, gaining access to the state court system should not become
163. Id. at 1886-91 (discussing the differences between state and federal adjudicators).
164. OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison, 1980 OK 188, 4, 621 P.2d 528, 530
(assessing litigant's standing under an "aggrieved party" analysis); see also supra Part Ill.
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effortless. The application of federal standing guidelines provides only one
formula by which to assess a claimant's right to state court review. In the past
Oklahoma courts have instituted other methods to evaluate a plaintiffs
standing. 166 The following section recommends that Oklahoma courts return
to standing evaluations employed prior to the adoption of the federal standing
requirement and that they concurrently develop a more state-specific standing
requirement to better respond to legal issues raised by Oklahoma citizens.
2. Recommendation: Reinstate JudicialAccess Requirements Priorto
the Adoption of FederalStanding
The Oklahoma Supreme Court should abandon the regimented federal
standing doctrine and reinstate its previous state standing applications that
have the potential to address more effectively local concerns brought before
state courts. Prior to adopting the federal standing formula, Oklahoma
assessed a litigant's ability to bring a claim in state court by applying a
"proper party plaintiff" or "aggrieved party status" inquiry. 167 These inquiries,
although similar in some ways to the federal standing requirements,' 68 allow
more room for judicial interpretation in assessing who should be allowed to
seek relief in Oklahoma courts.
For example, the "aggrieved party" requirement involved a more simplistic
investigation into the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claim. The investigation
focused primarily on whether the claimant was the right person to bring a
claim before the court, and courts made the determination without an
extensive multipart analysis as required by the federal standing inquiry.'69 By
returning to a more simplistic standing assessment, Oklahoma courts would
acquire greater freedom to construct the state's judicial access requirements
independent of the strict barriers required by the federal standing analysis. In
turn, this freedom could substantially benefit state claimants by providing a
more accessible state judiciary for the adjudication of legitimate claims that
may not pass muster under federal standing requirements.

166. See supra Part IlI.
167. See supra Part II.
168. Cleary Petroleum, 4, 621 P.2d at 530. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's standing
analysis in Cleary Petroleum mirrors the federal standing requirement in two ways. First, the

assessment of the plaintiffs "aggrieved party" status in Cleary Petroleum resembles the federal
"injury in fact" component in that the court required "injuriously affected" interests. Second,
the court required that "the effect of a judgment must be direct, substantial and immediate,
rather than contingent on some future event," which relates to the federal component of
redressability. Id.
169. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss1/8
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C. Potential CriticismsAddressed
The absence of a case-or-controversy requirement in the Oklahoma
Constitution, as well as the unique function of a state courtjudge, supports the
contention that state courts should more specifically tailor state standing
requirements to serve local citizens. A shift in state standing requirements,
however, will not take place free of difficulties. Commentators pose three
criticisms of state divergence from the federal standing requirements. 7 0
First, by opening the state courthouse doors wider than those of Article III
courts, state judicial systems could become overwhelmed.'' The standing
requirements allow courts to filter out claims that thejudicial process may not
best resolve. Indeed, a change in state judicial access requirements under the
standing doctrine may potentially wreck havoc on already demanding state
court dockets. This argument, a version of the familiar floodgates
argument, 7" however, rests on the premise that the current amount of
litigation is "socially optimal."' 73 Perhaps a complicated, federally prescribed
assessment of a plaintiff's standing discourages plaintiffs with legitimate
claims from seeking state court review. Also, rather than burden the system,
reassessing state standing requirements may instead accelerate state courts'
participation in dispute resolution.
Second, criticisms arise concerning the possible unfairness of an adapted
state standing doctrine that allows litigants without adverse interests to bring
public issue claims.' 74 Even if reconfigured at the state level, however,
standing would continue to measure the intensity of a claimant's interest in
resolving a particular dispute. To resolve problems and also maintain adverse
litigants, state court judges would still assess the importance of the issue the
claimant presents.
Third, critics assert that a modified state standing doctrine would
destabilize political relations and distort policy formation.'7 5 This criticism
focuses on the superiority of the legislature in determining issues of public
importance, as well as the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial
process. Particularly at the state and local levels, however, the differing role
170. Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1930-40 (discussing criticisms of reconfiguring state
justiciability doctrines).
171. Id. at 1931.
172. See id.at 1932 n.515 ("Floodgates, like slippery slopes, invoke the unknown and
possibly unknowable consequences of legal change as a way to block reform.").
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1935-38. As Hershkoff states, "A second criticism focuses on th.. unfairness that
might arise if a reconfigured state justiciability doctrine were to allow individuals who lack
Article III adversity to adjudicate ...public issues." Id.at 1935.
175. Id. at 1938 (noting the criticism that a new approach to state justiciability doctrines will
"destabilize political relations by undermining majoritarian norms").
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of state court judges may actually enhance political relations and policy
formation.
V. Conclusion
Just as the Article III case-or-controversy requirement addresses important
issues in the federal system, state constitutional standing requirements should
address issues that are fundamental to state operations. Oklahoma adheres to
federal standing jurisprudence despite the U.S. Supreme Court's empowering
language recognizing that state judiciaries may establish their own,
independent standing analysis. Oklahoma should modify its current reliance
on federal standing principles by reinstating its former standing doctrine and
by reassessing how best to shape and give content to the state judicial
function. This change in Oklahoma's judicial access requirements will afford
Oklahomans their rightful opportunity to present legitimate claims in a more
accessible state judiciary.
Stasha D. McBride
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